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Abstract 
The Zhuangzi 莊子 depicts persons as surviving their deaths through the natural transformations of the world into very 
different forms—such as roosters, cart-wheels, rat livers, etc. It's common to interpret these passages metaphorically. 
But in this paper, I suggest employing a “Conventionalist” view of persons that says whether a person survives some 
event is not merely determined by the world, but is partly determined by our own attitudes. On this reading, Zhuangzi's 
many teachings urging us to embrace transformation are not merely a psychological aid for dealing with death, but 
also serve as a tool for literally surviving it. 
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1 Introduction 
In the Zhuangzi 莊子 chapter 6 "The Great and Venerable Teacher (Dazongshi 大宗師)", we 
encounter two stories of people who are thought to transform beyond their human form. One such 
story is this: 
 
All at once, Master Yu fell ill. Master Si went to ask how he was. "Amazing!" said Master 
Yu. "The Creator is making me all crookedly like this! My back sticks up like a hunchback, 
and my vital organs are on top of me. My chin is hidden in my navel, my shoulders are up 
above my head, and my pigtail points at the sky. It must be some dislocation of the yin and 
yang!" 
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 Yet he seemed calm at heart and unconcerned. Dragging himself haltingly to the well, 
he looked at his reflection and said, "My, my! So the Creator is making me all crookedly 
like this!" 
 "Do you resent it?" asked Master Si. 
 "Why no, what would I resent? If the process continues, perhaps in time he'll transform 
my left arm into a rooster. In that case I'll keep watch during the night. Or perhaps in time 
he'll transform my right arm into a crossbow pellet, and I'll shoot down an owl for roasting. 
Or perhaps in time he'll transform my buttocks into cart-wheels. Then, with my spirit for a 
horse, I'll climb up and go for a ride. What need will I ever have for a carriage again?" 
(Watson 2013: 47-8) 
 
We all know that bodies undergo great transformation. Our body ages, eventually dies, then 
undergoes decomposition, leaving the molecules that made up the body to disperse, and eventually 
become integrated—via absorption, consumption, etc.—with other plants and animals (such as 
roosters), or artifacts (such as cart-wheels), etc. But part of what's striking about this passage is 
that Master Yu doesn't just take his molecules to take on these new forms, but also he himself takes 
on those new forms. For he doesn't merely say that if his left arm turned into a rooster, it would 
keep watch during the night—rather, he uses the first person pronoun "I (yu 予)" to indicate that it 
would be he himself who would be the rooster. 
 The story of Master Yu is ambiguous between whether we are to imagine his arm turning into 
a rooster while Master Yu is still alive in his human form, or only after he has died. But the story 
immediately following strongly indicates that (at least in part) what's in mind is transformation 
after one's death: 
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Suddenly Master Lai grew ill. Gasping and wheezing, he lay at the point of death. His wife 
and children gathered round in a circle and began to cry. Master Li, who had come to ask 
how he was, said “Shoo! Get Back! Don’t disturb the process of change!”  
 Then he leaned against the doorway and talked to Master Lai. “How marvelous the 
Creator is! What is he going to make out of you next? Where is he going to send you? Will 
he make you into a rat’s liver? Will he make you into a bug’s arm?” (Watson 2013: 48) 
 
Clearly the transformation into a rat's liver or bug's arm is conceived as happening after Master 
Lai's death. So the stories of Masters Yu and Lai taken together indicate that people can continue 
to exist beyond their own death in a naturalistic sort of way. Such survival doesn't require the 
existence of a supernatural realm that we go to after death. Nor does it require the existence of 
some immaterial soul that can be reincarnated in different forms. Rather, the Zhuangzi treats their 
survival as consisting in their continued existence on earth as one (or more) of the myriad things—
such as roosters, cart-wheels, bug arms, etc. (The view also seems to imply that one can exist as a 
scattered object. For even if the molecules of one's decomposed body scatter in different directions, 
the text seems to suggest that those scattered molecules would still be parts of Master Yu. Thus, if 
Master Yu simultaneously has both a rooster and a spatially disconnected crossbow pellet as parts, 
he could simultaneously keep watch during the night and shoot down an owl for roasting.)1  
 This view is highly counter-intuitive. We ordinarily think that we cease to exist at death. And 
even if our corpse were to turn into a rooster, that rooster wouldn't be oneself.2 For this reason, it's 
 
1 One might think this idea is absurd, for Master Yu cannot be two different objects. But the claim here is not that he 
would be two objects, but only that he is one object with at least two (spatially disconnected) parts. 
2 We might make the story more believable if we assume that Zhuangzi is saying that, were Master Yu's body turned 
into a rooster, the rooster wouldn't have any of Master Yu's memories or personality, but would just have the 
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not surprising that many scholars interpret these stories metaphorically, denying that the Zhuangzi 
intends anything about the survival of death. For instance, Jung H. Lee says "Ziyu [Master Yu] 
will not enjoy another life as a rooster or owl" (Lee 2014: 114) and he further claims that 
"ultimately, Zhuangzi suggests that a transcendence of the fear of death can only commence with 
the recognition that one's personal identity eventually expires (a notion unthinkable for many 
ancient Chinese) as part of the transformations of the Dao" (Lee 2014: 119). Louis Komjathy 
likewise says that the passages "seem to indicate that death is the dissolution of self, the separation 
of the various elements of personhood. There is no personal post-mortem existence, no personal 
survival after death" (Komjathy 2013: 140). Kim-chong Chong, referring to the stories of Masters 
Yu and Lai, says that "[Xunzi's] definition of hua (化), or transformation, opposes the way that 
Zhuangzi uses the term.... [According to Xunzi] something may be said to have been transformed 
only when it is one and the same entity that has undergone a process of change" (Chong 2016: 50-
1). Thus, Chong is assuming that, in Master Yu's story, it would not be one and the same entity 
that is a human at one time and a rooster at the other.3 Mark Berkson also denies that there is a self 
that persists through the change, instead holding that "there is simply an ongoing series of 
transformation" (Berkson 2019: 26). Xiaogan Liu takes Master Yu's hypothesizing as mere 
"imagination", taking the story to not have implications concerning our ability to survive death:  
 
no matter how depressing [Master Yu's] health may be, he can always shift it to a positive, 
even optimistic mode through curiosity and imagination. What the author wants to express 
 
psychology of a normal rooster. Nonetheless, it would still be counter-intuitive to hold that such Master Yu himself 
would be that rooster. 
3 Notice that I’m not claiming that Chong accepts Xunzi’s definition. But in the quote, Chong indicates that Xunzi’s 
definition conflicts with the way Zhuangzi uses the term hua; my claim is just that Chong would not think that such a 
conflict arises if he interpreted Zhuangzi as holding that it is the same entity that is at one time a human, and then at 
another time a rooster.  
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is clear: by learning to keep your mind and mood at ease towards adversity people can 
mount the springboard from which to jump into a sphere of spiritual freedom. (Liu 2015: 
200-1) 
 
Others likewise shy away from drawing conclusions about our ability to survive. Mercedes 
Valmisa says "the key teaching in this story is that, however big the changes, even if they involve 
terminal disease, we should not fear or hate them but adapt to them and see in them a window of 
opportunity" (Valmisa 2015: 8). And Mary Bockover says "these seem like absurd possibilities, I 
think the point is this: life is unpredictable and can do anything. The question is, what will we 
make of it? Will we live virtuously or the best we can despite what life might throw at us?" 
(Bockover 2020: 53). 
 In this paper, I will go against the trend and instead suggest interpreting the Zhuangzi as literally 
holding that we can survive our death in the above envisioned ways. In order to both provide a 
framework for doing so and lend credibility to such a reading, I will draw from recent work in 
metaphysics that holds that persons are in some sense "conventional". On this view, whether we 
survive an event (at least sometimes) isn't wholly determined by the world, but is at least in part 
determined by our attitudes. In particular, I suggest reading Zhuangzi as holding a sort of 
Conventionalism that is both extreme and nuanced: it’s extreme because it holds that, by 
undergoing a "freeing of the bound (xian jie 縣解)", one's attitudes are changed in such a way that 
one literally survives death, and undergoes the various transformations of their body; and it’s 
nuanced because only one aspect of oneself—what Zhuangzi calls the “wu-self”—can survive 
death in this way. In section 2 I further explicate this Conventionalism about personal identity, and 
in sections 3 and 4 I explain and defend the Conventionalist view that I attribute to Zhuangzi. 
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Finally, I draw out connections between this Conventionalist reading and other passages in the 
Zhuangzi in section 5. 
  
 
2 Personal Identity and Conventionalism 
Commonsense tells us that we persist over time. I not only exist today, but I also existed yesterday, 
and a year ago, and much further back to when I was just a wee baby. This implies that there are 
changes that I can survive: I survive the change from being a baby to being an adult. But 
commonsense also tells us that there are events that we don't survive, such as being burnt to a crisp 
and having one's ashes dispersed across the universe. 4  But what criteria of personal identity 
accounts for the fact that I can survive some kinds of changes, but not others? That is, what are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a person at one time being identical to an entity5 at another 
time? Reflection on this question has brought philosophers to two main candidate answers. The 
first is a psychological criterion—for instance, John Locke's (1694) points to memory (though see 
Parfit’s (1984) for a more sophisticated view). Thus, since I'm psychologically continuous in the 
right way—such as via memory—with the baby that lived some years ago, I'm identical to that 
baby. Likewise, since I'm not psychologically connected in the right way to the dispersed remains 
of my burnt body—for instance, it doesn't have my memories—I wouldn't be identical to such a 
dispersed object. The second candidate answer is a physical criterion (see especially Olson (1999)). 
 
4 This commonsense intuition might seem to be in tension with the sort of Conventionalism that I attribute to the 
Zhuangzi on which we can exist as the scattered remains of our body. But we can address this apparent conflict by 
pointing out that our intuition is indeed true of ordinary cases: people don't normally have the sort of attitude that 
allows them to survive such a transformation. So we can say that commonsense is correct about such normal 
circumstances, we just shouldn't try to extend it to say that it's impossible to alter one's attitude in a way that allows 
one to survive in such a way. 
5 Here I take the term “entity” to apply to any sort of object—persons and non-persons, wholes and parts of wholes 
alike. 
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On this view, one could say: the baby is the same biological organism as me, and is therefore 
identical to me; but the collection of dispersed ashes is not since it's not a biological organism, and 
so isn't identical to me. 
 To more clearly see that these are two different answers, rather than the same answer stated in 
two different ways, consider a teletransportation process much like that found in the western tv 
show Star Trek. Suppose the process works as follows: you step into an initial teletransportation 
machine on earth where the machine records all of your physical and psychological data, then the 
machine disintegrates you into your component atoms. Finally, a second receiving machine on, 
say, the moon, uses materials and molecules on the moon to create an exact physical and 
psychological duplicate of you. Now the question is this: did you survive the teletransportation 
trip? Those who hold the psychological view will answer “yes”: the duplicate is psychologically 
continuous with you in the right way, and so is you. But those who hold the physical view will 
answer “no”: the duplicate is not the same biological organism as you, which is evident from the 
fact that it's made from completely different atoms, hence the duplicate is not oneself.6 So which 
view is correct? Do I survive teletransportation or not?  
 The fact that there seems to be no real way to settle the debate has led many to the 
"Conventionalist" conclusion that the issue in part depends on one's person-directed attitudes7—
see for instance, White (1989), Johnston (1989: 2010), Braddon-Mitchell and West (2001), 
Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2004), Miller (2013), and Kovacs (2016; 2020). To illustrate, 
consider two communities. Those in the “Somataphile Community” believe they don't survive 
 
6 Of course, those who hold that physical view can hold that one's baby self and one's current self can be made of 
completely different atoms and yet still be identical, but this is only because the process was gradual enough to 
preserve physical identity between the two stages. In teletransportation, on the other hand, the process is abrupt. 
7 Conventionalists differ on which particular attitudes are relevant for determining one's survival conditions. For 
instance, Johnston emphasizes attitudes such as anticipation (Johnston 2010), Kovacs takes it to be one's beliefs 
(Kovacs 2016; 2020), and Braddon-Mitchell and Miller include attitudes concerning responsibility and property 
ownership (Braddon-Mitchell and Miller 2004). 
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teletransportation, and have the corresponding person-directed attitudes: they fear 
teletransportation as death, they don't anticipate the experiences of the duplicate as being their very 
own experiences, etc. Those in the “Teletransporter Community”, on the other hand, believe they 
survive and have the corresponding person-directed attitudes: they freely embrace 
teletransportation, treating it merely as a form of convenient and high-speed travel, they likewise 
anticipate the experiences of the duplicate as being their very own experiences, etc. 
Conventionalists hold that it's intuitive8  that neither community can be said to be wrong or 
mistaken; rather each community is correct on their own terms—the Somataphiles don't survive 
teletransportation, while the Teletransporters do.9 And Conventionalists point to the difference in 
person-directed attitudes as accounting for the difference in survival conditions between the two 
communities. This is what Mark Johnston calls the "radical reversal" (Johnston 2010: 272). 
Roughly put, we ordinarily think that whether or not we survive an event should determine whether 
or not we should fear it as we do death, but on Conventionalism, matters are reversed—whether 
or not we fear a process as death determines whether or not we survive that process. 
 Here I should make one important clarification: Conventionalism does not claim that our 
attitudes can determine the physical facts, rather it's just a claim that our attitudes can determine 
the identity facts. For example, in the above teletransportation situation, the physical facts include 
the fact that you are disintegrated by the initial teletransportation machine on earth, then the 
receiving machine on the moon makes a physical and psychological duplicate of you out of atoms 
 
8  Some, such as Johnston (2010), Zimmerman (2012) and Kovacs (2016; 2020), base this intuition on a pre-
commitment to a permissive ontology (such as a rich form of Four-Dimensionalism) on which, coinciding each person, 
there is both an object that survives teletransportation and an object that does not. If the plausibility of Conventionalism 
rested on such an ontology, it makes it less likely that Zhuangzi is a Conventionalist. But many other Conventionalists 
think the view is plausible even without an antecedent commitment to such a permissive ontology (see for instance 
Miller (2013); also White (1989) and Braddon-Mitchell and West (2001) make no appeal to such an ontology to 
motivate Conventionalism). 
9 Notice that this is not the claim that the communities’ ways of life are equally beneficial. For the psychological 
community does have the advantage of high-speed travel.  
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that weren't originally part of you in the initial machine. Conventionalism is not the claim that your 
attitudes can affect these physical facts. For instance, it does not claim that your attitudes can 
determine whether or not the duplication will succeed; if the device on the moon were to fail—
instead making, say, a person with different psychological features from you, or even just 
producing a fish, a flower, or failing to produce anything at all—this is just a fault of the machinery, 
rather than your attitudes. On the other hand, supposing that the teletransportation process were to 
successfully make a duplicate of you on the moon, Conventionalism does claim that your attitudes 
determine whether or not that duplicate on the moon is you. So it is the identity facts that 
Conventionalism claims is under the control of our attitudes, not the physical facts. 
 
 
3 Zhuangzi as Conventionalist 
I propose reading Zhuangzi as a Conventionalist. To begin to see why, I think the Conventionalist 
view fits well with Zhuangzi's tendency to take distinctions and divisions not as objective facts to 
be found in the world, but rather as originating from the mind. For instance, in chapter 2 
"Discussion on Making All Things Equal (Qiwulun 齊物論)", Zhuangzi says: 
 
Everything has its "that [bi 彼]," everything has its "this [shi 是]." From the point of view 
of "that," you cannot see it; but through understanding, you can know it. So I say, "that" 
comes out of "this," and "this" depends on "that"—which is to say that "this" and "that" give 
birth to each other.... Therefore the sage...recognizes a "this" but a "this" that is also "that" 
a "that" that is also "this." His "that" has both a right [shi] and a wrong [fei 非] in it; his 
"this," too, has both a right [shi] and a wrong [fei] in it. (Watson 2013: 10) 
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Notice that the distinction between "shi" and "fei" here includes many layers of meaning: it's a 
distinction between what exists and what doesn't exist, what's correct and incorrect and also a 
distinction between what's good and bad (CHEN Jing (2001: 52) and CHEN Yun (2012: 44)). The 
Zhuangzi is thus pointing out that the sage doesn't make such absolute distinctions between such 
kinds of "shi" and "fei" because there are no such absolute distinctions to be found in the world. 
This is why Zhuangzi says "if discriminations are put into words, they do not suffice" and "those 
who discriminate fail to see" (Watson 2013: 14). Likewise Zhuangzi emphasizes the fact that such 
boundaries originate in the mind: "The Way has never known boundaries; speech has no constancy. 
But because of [the recognition of a] "this [shi]," there came to be boundaries" (Watson 2013: 13). 
Instead Zhuangzi admonishes us to give up distinctions altogether: 
 
Right is not right; so is not so. If right were really right, it would differ so clearly from not 
right that there would be no need for argument. If so were really so, it would differ so clearly 
from not so that there would be no need for argument. Forget the years; forget distinctions. 
Leap into the boundless and make it your home! (Watson 2013: 17) 
 
Likewise many commentators explicitly take the Zhuangzi to hold distinctions to be mind-made. 
For instance, CHEN Yun writes: "Things themselves don’t have shi-fei, bi-ci (彼此) distinctions. 
Only when things are brought into relationship with people—on the basis of their epistemic 
perspective and examination—do such shi-fei, bi-ci distinctions exist" (Chen 2012: 44; my 
translation). And Kuang-Ming Wu comments: "the object-self (wo) is 'obtrusive' in that, as Kant 
said, it has its 'experience' only by imposing its synthetic-apriori forms on reality, on thing-in-
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itself.... The wo-self originates division (fen), a subjective regarding of the objects as different from 
the self..." (Wu 1990: 184-5).  
 So there is a strong emphasis in the Zhuangzi on the mind-dependence of divisions and 
distinctions. For this reason I don't think it would be surprising at all to find that the Zhuangzi 
holds a similar attitude concerning the divisions involved in personal identity—specifically 
boundaries demarcating when one exists and when that same entity ceases to exist. In fact, I think 
the Masters Yu and Lai passages quoted at the outset of this paper indicate that the Zhuangzi does 
indeed apply the mind-dependence of divisions to personal identity; for in those passages we see 
the Zhuangzi revising those divisions. To be clear, I'm not claiming that the Zhuangzi thinks our 
attitudes can determine the physical facts: that Master Yu's body at one point stops all its 
functioning, that his body eventually decays into the ground, and that his body's molecules later 
become integrated into, say, a rooster, cart-wheel or rat liver, are all facts that are determined by 
the world, rather than one's mind or attitudes. But I do think that for the Zhuangzi, the world itself 
does not determine where in that process lies the border that marks the point at which Master Yu 
ceases to exist; instead such an identity fact originates from our minds. That is why Master Yu can 
continue to exist even after his body has decayed and its composite molecules have dispersed. 
Ordinary people, because of their attitudes, cease to exist at death—that is, they cease to exist once 
their biological and psychological functions have stopped; but because personal identity facts are 
mind-dependent, Master Yu is able to revise or even do away with such divisions and survive his 
death. 
 So I propose reading Zhuangzi as a sort of Conventionalist. But we can see that Zhuangzi would 
hold a very peculiar and extreme sort of Conventionalism. For where Conventionalists typically 
assume that one can survive a process, so long as the process results in a person (such as a duplicate 
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of oneself), Zhuangzi holds that Masters Yu and Lai can survive death as non-persons—such as 
roosters, cart-wheels, bug arms, etc. And they can survive in such an extreme way only because 
their attitudes differ from our ordinary attitudes in radical ways.  
 What are their radical attitudes? Master Yu tells us: "I received life because the time had come; 
I will lose it because the order of things passes on. Be content with this time and dwell in this order, 
and then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In ancient times this was called the 'freeing of the 
bound.'" (Watson 2013: 48) I take this attitude that is "free of the bound (xian jie 縣解)"10 to be 
further elucidated in various other passages (though if one disagrees with me on this point, one 
may use a different umbrella term to link them). For instance: 
 
Master Si, Master Yu, Master Li, and Master Lai were all four talking together. "Who can 
look on nonbeing as his head, on life as his back, and on death as his rump?" they said. 
"Who knows that life and death, existence and annihilation, are all a single body? I will be 
his friend!" 
 The four men looked at one another and smiled. There was no disagreement in their 
hearts, and so the four of them became friends. (Watson 2013: 47) 
 
Where most people look upon death as the end of their existence, these friends take it instead as a 
part of that existence. Also, from the passages quoted at the very beginning of this paper, we know 
that the four friends not only see the particular moment of death as part of their existence, but also 
the subsequent transformations that their corpse undergoes.  
 Further elucidating this unbound attitude, Master Lai explains:  
 
10 The term xian jie also appears in at the end of chapter 3 "The Secret of Caring for Life (Yangshengzhu 養生主)". 
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When a skilled smith is casting metal, if the metal should leap up and say, "I insist on being 
made into a Moye!" he would surely regard it as very inauspicious metal indeed. Now, 
having had the audacity to take on human form once, if I should say, "I don't want to be 
anything but a man! Nothing but a man!" the Creator would surely regard me as a most 
inauspicious sort of person. So now I think of heaven and earth as a great furnace, and the 
Creator as a skilled smith. Where could he send me that would not be all right? (Watson 
2013: 48-9) 
 
In sum, Master Yu and Master Lai have an unbound attitude characterized by taking death and the 
resulting transformations as part of their existence, embracing whatever changes will occur to 
them—even disfiguration or death—not demanding that they remain in human form, but being all 
right with whatever new forms they encounter. 
 And this unbound attitude is echoed and praised in other parts of the Zhuangzi as well. We are 
told that the sage "delights in early death; he delights in old age; he delights in the beginning; he 
delights in the end." (Watson 2013: 45) Furthermore  
 
The True Man of ancient times knew nothing of loving life, knew nothing of hating death. 
He emerged without delight; he went back in without a fuss. He came briskly, he went 
briskly, and that was all. He didn't forget where he began; he didn't try to find out where 
he would end. He received something and took pleasure in it; he forgot about it and handed 
it back again. (Watson 2013: 43) 
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And in chapter 5 “The Sign of Virtue Complete (Dechongfu 德充符)” the Zhuangzi illustrates this 
attitude through Wang Tai, an ex-convict who had his leg chopped off, explaining "life and death 
are great affairs, and yet they are no change to [Wang Tai]. Though heaven and earth flop over 
and fall down, it is no loss to him.... As for things, he sees them as one and does not see their loss. 
He regards the loss of a foot as a lump of earth thrown away" (Watson 2013: 34-5). 
 So I suggest interpreting the Zhuangzi as holding that, in having an unbound attitude that 
embraces the transformations that one's body undergoes, one can survive death and the endless 
transformations thereafter. In other words, much as Conventionalists typically think the members 
of the Teletransporter Community survive teletransportation since they neither fear it nor try to 
avoid it, but rather embrace it and view their duplicate as a continuation of their existence, so 
Zhuangzi holds that those who are free from the bound survive death and the subsequent endless 
transformations since they neither fear nor try to avoid those transformations, but rather embrace 
them and see them as a continuation of their own existence. 
 
3.1 The wu-self and the wo-self 
I have already mentioned that Zhuangzi goes beyond standard forms of Conventionalism by 
holding a radical version of it. But another way in which Zhuangzi's Conventionalism is unique is 
in holding there to be different kinds of selves, not all of which can survive death.  In chapter 2, 
Ziqi of South Wall claims that "I have lost myself (jinzhe wu sang wo 今者吾喪我)" (Watson 2013: 
7). Though both "wu (吾)" and "wo (我)" are first-person pronouns, Zhuangzi here is treating them 
as referring to different selves. (There are also other first-person pronouns used throughout the 
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Zhuangzi, but they seem closely interconnected with wu and wo.11) One main difference between 
the wu-self and wo-self worth pointing out is their connection to social roles. DUAN Yucai 段玉裁, 
the commentator of the authoritative Chinese dictionary in the Han 漢 dynasty Explaining Graphs 
and Analyzing Characters (Shuowen Jiezi 說文解字), explains "when one is talking about oneself 
amongst others, the appropriate word for self-reference is wo". In contrast, wu was to be used in 
one's private thoughts when one thinks about oneself. For this reason, Thomas Ming takes the wu-
self to be a "private-self" and the wo-self to be a "social-self" (Ming 2016: 61). CHEN Jing similarly 
takes the passage to be a reaction to the Confucian view that persons are defined in terms of the 
role they play in their web of relationships—such as the ruler-subject, father-son, husband-wife 
relationships (Chen 2001: 51). Chen explains that, for Zhuangzi, the wo-self corresponds to the 
Confucian self that is defined by those roles, but that the wo-self, in being so defined, loses its 
naturalness in carrying the burden of having to fulfill those roles (Watson 2013: 52). Consequently, 
being so characterized by artificiality, the wo-self is unable to achieve "you (遊)"—which for 
Zhuangzi is the highest state of freedom. On the other hand, the wu-self can extricate itself from 
the constraining roles of the wo-self, and draw closer to the state of you. 
 Given the above characterizations of the wu- and wo-self, a Conventionalist interpretation of 
Zhuangzi should hold that it is the wu-self, and not the wo-self, that is able to survive death. One 
reason for this is that it's impossible to fulfill societal roles—such as being a good parent to one's 
child, or a good ruler to one's subjects—if one were a corpse, a rooster or a cart-wheel. So given 
 
11 For instance, in claiming that "the sage has no self (zhiren wuji 至人無己), "ji" is closely tied to the "wo" which one 
can lose. And in chapter 5, "wu" is used as closely synonymous with "yu (予)". For there in chapter 5, Liezi, a follower 
of Huizi, becomes convinced that the teachings of the shaman Ji Xian are greater than Huizi's own. On hearing Liezi's 
intoxication with the shaman, Huizi replies: "I have already showed you all the outward forms, but I haven't yet showed 
you the substance...try bringing your shaman along next time and letting him get a look at me (yushi 予示)." The 
shaman thus comes to visit Huizi on a number of occasions, and each time Huizi explains to Liezi what Huizi had 
shown of himself to the shaman, using the term "wushi 吾示" in each such explanation. 
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that the wo-self is so defined by those social roles and death prevents the wo-self's fulfillment of 
those roles, death thereby also brings the destruction of the wo-self. On the other hand, since the 
wu-self isn't so characterized in this way, this leaves open the possibility that it exist even when 
unable to fulfill such social roles. 
Similarly, we have already seen Kuang-Ming Wu's claim that "the wo-self originates division 
(fen), a subjective regarding of the objects as different from the self..." (Wu 1990: 185). Tied in 
with the Conventionalist reading, the idea then is that the wo-self is the one that has a bound 
attitude that takes death as marking the boundary between existence and non-existence. However, 
in losing the wo-self, the wu-self can broaden or completely do away with all such boundaries 
between itself and what comes before and after it. In this way the wu-self can survive death and 
participate in the transformations of the world. 
 
 
4 Clarifications and Objections 
Let me now make some clarifications about my reading and address some objections. One might 
object that the use of humor in the stories of Masters Yu and Lai indicate that Zhuangzi does not 
intend those stories to be taken literally. For instance, Master Yu speaking of his buttocks turning 
into wheels, or imagining Master Lai becoming a rat’s liver might seem like playful examples not 
to be taken seriously. In response, I take the examples not as telling against a literal translation, 
but instead as expressions of an unbound attitude that welcomes death with playful ease and even 
giddy delight—for only those with a bound attitude would think death is something to be talked 
about solemnly and seriously. Furthermore, since those who are unbound welcome all the 
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transformations they face, they likewise don’t insist on being transformed into something noble 
and respectable, but delight even in becoming something as humble as a rat’s liver. 
A separate issue concerns what Zhuangzi thinks surviving as a rat's liver or cart-wheel is like. 
Do such things even have conscious experiences? That is, is Zhuangzi a sort of panpsychist? Some 
such as Brian Hoffert (2015), Eric Schwitzgebel (2018) and Jenny Hung (2019) think so. One 
passage in support of this claim is the story of Lady Li who wept when she was kidnapped, but 
regretted her tears when she discovered her new life was better than her former one; the text then 
asks "how do I know that the dead do not wonder why they ever longed for life?" (Watson 2013: 
16). Another passage is taken from Master Lai's death bed monologue: "The Great Clod burdens 
me with form, labors me with life, eases me in old age, and rests me in death.... I will go off to 
sleep peacefully, and then with a start, I will wake up" (Watson 2013: 48-9). Though these might 
suggest a panpsychist reading, I think one can also reasonably resist such a reading. The Lady Li 
passage doesn't itself commit to the idea that the dead are able to have emotions such as regret, 
rather the passage only raises it as a conceptual possibility. Furthermore, one might take the moral 
of the story simply to be this: the state of being dead (even if it doesn't involve conscious 
experience) could be better than the state of being alive. Such a moral doesn't require panpsychism. 
As for Master Lai's death bed monologue, even if we deny a panpsychist reading, we can still hold 
that one can regain consciousness after death by becoming a conscious being such as a rooster or 
horse (or even just some part of their brain). Thus in saying "with a start, I will wake up" Master 
Lai might be referring to such phases in the process of transformation. So I think one can plausibly 
hold a non-panpsychist reading. Nonetheless, both the panpsychist and non-panpsychist views are 
compatible with a Conventionalist reading of the Zhuangzi. 
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 One might object that the extreme sort of Conventionalism that I attribute to the Zhuangzi is 
philosophically untenable. For instance, Mark Johnston argues that one couldn't transform into a 
non-person because non-persons don't have interests. As he says:  
 
Only persons have interests in the relevant sense. In the sense of interest at hand, the sense 
that is relevant to identifying with some person as my "future self," only persons, that is, 
reflective intelligent beings that can consider themselves as themselves at various times 
and places, have interests.... The relevant disposition could not get a purchase on spiders, 
rainforests, crystals, or the like. (Johnston 2010: 277) 
 
In other words, since  
 
 (a) one can only identify with something that has real interests, and  
 
 (b) only persons have such interests 
 
it follows that one couldn't identify with non-persons. Therefore, if surviving as something requires 
identifying with it, then one couldn't survive as a non-person. 
 But I believe Zhuangzi would deny premise (a), holding it to just be a form of bound thinking. 
Just as Zhuangzi takes someone who says "I don't want to be anything but a man! Nothing but a 
man!" to be "a most inauspicious sort of person" (Watson 2013: 48-9), so Zhuangzi would hold 
the attraction of (a) as deriving from our desire to “be something with real interests! Nothing but 
something with real interests!” This deep-seated desire to cling to our status as reflective intelligent 
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beings that have interests makes us averse to identifying with spiders, cart-wheels or rat livers. 
And it's easy to mistake this overwhelming desire as an indication that such identification is 
impossible. But I take the Zhuangzi instead to be suggesting that, contrary to (a), we can indeed 
identify with such non-persons by unbinding ourselves from a narrow-minded unwillingness to let 
go of the familiar. 
 Another objection one might have with my reading is that it's incompatible with Zhuangzi's 
other teachings concerning the self. For instance, after Zhuangzi's wife died, Zhuangzi said 
 
I looked back to her beginning and the time...before she had a spirit. In the midst of the 
jumble of wonder and mystery, a change took place and she had a spirit. Another change 
and she had a body. Another change and she was born. Now there's been another change 
and she's dead. It's just like the progression of the four seasons: spring, summer, fall, winter. 
(Watson 2013: 141) 
 
There are two different kinds of objection one might raise to the Conventionalist reading in 
connection with this passage. The first objection is this: here Zhuangzi indicates that, just as the 
change in seasons is inevitable and occurs regardless of one’s attitudes, so the changes that occur 
to one’s body—including death—are inevitable and occur regardless of our attitudes. One might 
think this is in tension with the Conventionalist view. But this objection only arises if one 
overlooks the distinction between physical and identity facts. For the Conventionalist can agree 
that the physical changes that happen to oneself happen regardless of one’s attitudes since 
Conventionalism is just the claim that our attitudes determine the identity facts. In other words, 
Zhuangzi doesn’t need to know anything about his wife’s attitudes to know whether or not she has 
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died. If she hasn’t taken a breath and her heart hasn’t beaten for over a week, then she is indeed 
dead—no need to consult her attitudes. But whether she still exists as the dead corpse or as any 
number of other things does require an understanding of her attitudes. 
 A second objection that might arise in connection with this passage is more subtle. The 
objection says: if Zhuangzi truly is a Conventionalist, then we should expect Zhuangzi here to 
mention that his wife existed prior to her acquiring a body and/or that she continued to exist after 
she died. Yet Zhuangzi doesn’t mention either of these things.12 In response, we should first 
recognize that this story belongs to the outer chapters, and so we should be extra hesitant in 
assuming that it was penned by the same author that penned the stories of Masters Yu and Lai. But 
even if we make this assumption there are a couple possible responses we could make. One is to 
hold that even if Zhuangzi didn't believe his wife survives death, this is only because he realized 
she didn't have the right attitudes; so Zhuangzi had to cope with her death in a different way. 
Alternatively, we can read the passage not as denying that his wife survived death, but as 
presenting Zhuangzi's own self-treatment of his bound attitude towards her death. For Zhuangzi 
realized that in mourning her death, he himself was clinging to her human form. And the way to 
treat and avoid such clinging isn't through the reminder that his wife survives, but is primarily 
carried out through the recognition of the naturalness of the endless changes of the world. In other 
words, though recognizing that she survives could help treat Zhuangzi's grief, Zhuangzi is here 
 
12 Though Watson's translation says "a change took place and she had a spirit. Another change and she had a body" 
(Watson 2013:141; emphasis mine), thus suggesting that she existed prior to her birth, the original Chinese doesn't 
employ a pronoun such as "she": bian er you qi, qi bian er you xing 變而有氣，氣變而有形. Also, had Zhuangzi used, 
the term hua (化) here, that might have indicated that Zhuangzi takes it to be the same entity that persists through all 
the changes (this is, at least, how Xunzi 荀子 in his “Rectifying Names (Zheng Ming 正名)” understands the term: 
“Something which has its form changed but in reality is the same, this is called hua (zhuangbian er shi wubie er 
weiyizhe weizhi hua 狀變而實無別而為異者謂之化)”. The word bian (變), however, is the term that Zhuangzi actually 
uses, which might not seem to have this same implication. 
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recognizing that the fundamental problem isn't his grief, but his bound attitude—a problem that 
requires a very different kind of treatment.  
 To better understand my Conventionalist reading of the Zhuangzi, let me compare it to A.C. 
Graham's: 
 
The liberation from selfhood is seen above all as a triumph over death. [Zhuangzi's] 
position is not that personal consciousness will survive death, rather that in grasping the 
Way one's viewpoint shifts from 'I shall no longer exist' to something like 'In losing 
selfhood I shall remain what at bottom I have always been, identical with all the endlessly 
transforming phenomena of the universe.'  (Graham 1989: 202) 
 
I assume that, by "losing selfhood", Graham doesn't mean to say that one ceases to exist, but only 
has in mind the attitude of not clinging to a particular form or state—such as having a healthy 
undisfigured body or being human. (Though if he instead means that one ceases to exist, or that 
there is no self to begin with, then the view is obviously quite different from my own.) Given this 
assumption, Graham interprets the Zhuangzi as saying that in death, one continues to exist as "all 
the endlessly transforming phenomena of the universe" (Graham 1989: 202). This is different from 
my own Conventionalist interpretation since mine doesn't imply that one is necessarily identical 
with all the transformations of the universe, but might only be identical to some of those 
transformations. My interpretation allows for this possibility since people can have different 
attitudes; for even if one embraces death as part of their own existence, it's still open to them 
whether they will identify with the transformations of the entire universe—and so hold that "the 
ten thousand things are one with me (wanwu yu wo wei yi 萬物與我為一)" (Watson 2013: 13)—or 
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just identify with the transformations of a particular part of it. And I take this feature of my 
account to have textual backing. For Master Yu only identifies with the transformations that his 
body undergoes—such as his left arm turning into a rooster, or his right arm turning into a crossbow 
pellet—rather than the transformations of the entire universe. Master Lai likewise isn't thought of 
as transforming into a whole bug, but just its arm, nor is he thought of as transforming into an 
entire rat, but just its liver. 
 A final point of clarification about my account is that I do not intend to claim that the survival 
of death is the primary or only goal for Zhuangzi. One who takes a Conventionalist interpretation 
of Zhuangzi can still agree that Zhuangzi has other aims as well. For instance, as LUO Anxian 
explains, for Zhuangzi "the ordinary person's sorrow, the ordinary person's fatigue, the ordinary 
person's confusion, these problems are where Zhuangzi's concern lies" (Luo 2013: 57; my 
translation). And Kuang-Ming Wu says "to live rightly is neither living redemptively (Jesus) nor 
living enlightenedly (Buddha), but living appropriately, that is, fittingly to the changing climate of 
things, now soaring, now roaming—and that is [Zhuangzi’s] central concern" (Wu 1990: 81). 
Similarly, BAI Ruifen explains that, for Zhuangzi, "the 'heart-mind's highest realm is a pure and 
simple kind of free and natural state...one that shouldn't have a differentiation of 'merit points' nor 
the excessive miscellany of nobility and lowliness" (Bai 2012: 119; my translation). The 
Conventionalist reading of Zhuangzi is compatible with holding that Zhuangzi takes such a free 
and natural state to be the highest state; likewise, we can hold that Zhuangzi employs various 
therapeutic techniques—especially those in chapter 2 that have us doubt whether our shi-fei 
distinctions represent reality—are aimed at helping the ordinary person achieve such a state. My 
only claim is that Conventionalism is one aspect of Zhuangzi's larger vision that has gone ignored. 
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Likewise, Zhuangzi's therapeutic techniques not only help bring us into such a state of spiritual 
freedom, but they also help us to survive death by freeing us from the bound.  
  
 
5 Further Connections 
In this section I will draw out further connections between my Conventionalist reading of the 
Zhuangzi and other parts of the text, for this interpretation could help cast light upon or open up 
alternative interpretations of other passages. Though there are numerous passages that can be 
incorporated in this way, I will restrict my discussion to four. 
 The first two passages I will look at both seem to portray the Conventionalist idea that by 
altering one's attitudes one also alters one's survival conditions. The first of these is found near the 
end of chapter 6: 
  
 Yan Hui said, "I'm improving!" 
 Confucius said, "What do you mean by that?" 
 "I've forgotten benevolence and righteousness!" 
 "That's good. But you still haven't got it." 
 ... 
 Another day, the two met again, and Yan Hui said, "I'm improving!" 
 "What do you mean by that?" 
 "I can sit down and forget everything!" 
Confucius looked very startled and said, "What do you mean, sit down and forget 
everything?" 
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Yan Hui said, "I smash up my limbs and body, drive out perception and intellect, cast off 
form, do away with understanding, and make myself identical with the Great Thoroughfare. 
This is what I mean by sitting down and forgetting everything." 
Confucius said, "If you're identical with it, you must have no more likes! If you've been 
transformed, you must have no more constancy! So you really are a worthy man after all! 
With your permission, I'd like to become your follower." (Watson 2013: 52-3) 
 
This seems to indicate that a change in one's attitudes can lead to a change in one's identity or 
survival conditions. For in sitting and forgetting, Yan Hui becomes "identical with the Great 
Thoroughfare (tongyu datong 同於大通)" and therefore survives the transformations of the world. 
This metaphysical change is emphasized when Confucius says "if you've been transformed, you 
must have no more constancy! (hua ze wuchang ye 化則無常也)" I take Confucius here, who is 
speaking on behalf of Zhuangzi, as holding that the ordinary person is constant because, from the 
beginning to the end of their existence, they are a human. Yan Hui's existence, on the other, is not 
so confined to the stages where he is a human, and so is inconstant. 
 A similar account is found just prior to the stories of Masters Yu and Lai. There we have an 
account of Buliang Yi who undergoes a gradual multi-week process of learning the way of a sage. 
After some training he was able to "put the world outside himself.... after that he was able to put 
life outside himself... and after he had done away with past and present, he was able to enter where 
there is no life and no death" (Watson 2013: 46). Like the Yan Hui passage above, I also take this 
story as portraying Buliang Yi as becoming identical to the Great Thoroughfare of which all things 
are a part, and likewise as illustrating the sort of Conventionalism I have been defending. For the 
story not only describes the alteration of Buliang Yi's attitudes—where the process of putting 
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things outside of himself describes the freeing of the bound—but also explains that the change in 
those attitudes subsequently leads to Buliang Yi's survival of death—for at the end of the process 
he "was able to enter where there is no life and no death (而後能入於不死不生)".  
 One might question this reading since entering where "there is no life" seems to indicate a 
mysterious state of existence that transcends the state of being alive, and so is describing something 
quite different than the sort of “earthly” existence I have been concerned with (see Roth (2000) for 
this sort of interpretation). But, in response, we could instead interpret "sheng (生)" not as the state 
of living, but only as one's coming to be. Thus where "si (死)" is used to indicate the end of one's 
existence and "sheng" is used to indicate its beginning, the passage tells us that Buliang Yi was 
able to attain a state where his existence has neither end nor beginning—instead existing both 
through the beginningless past and endless future by means of the ongoing transformations of the 
Great Thoroughfare.13  Similarly, I interpret the passage immediately following (shashengzhe bu 
si, shengshengzhe bu sheng 殺生者不死，生生者不生) as: “that which kills life doesn’t cease to 
exist, and that which brings life into being doesn’t come to be”. I take this also to be a description 
of the Great Thoroughfare, which neither comes into nor out of existence, but gives life and brings 
death to all living things. (See Wang (2000: 347-8) for further evidence that Zhuangzi takes the 
world to be without beginning or end.) Though my Conventionalist reading of the Master Lai and 
 
13 It might seem strange that one's current attitudes can determine when—or even if—one came into existence in the 
past. For even if we can alter or affect the future we tend to think the past cannot be changed. In response, it’s good 
to keep in mind that the claim is not that our attitudes can affect the past physical facts—such as past qualitative facts 
and facts about the arrangement of mass-energy in the past; rather the claim is only that those attitudes can affect past 
identity facts—such as whether there was a point in the past at which Buliang Yi came into existence and where that 
point lies if there is such a point. Though most have a forceful intuition that we cannot affect past physical facts, I 
think there’s room to embrace the idea that we can affect past identity facts. And, in fact, Conventionalists tend to 
embrace such an idea—see for instance Braddon-Mitchell and White (2001: 68), Zimmerman (2012: 124) and Kovacs 
(2020: sect. 3.1). 
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Master Yu passages doesn't require that we also read this passage as relating to Conventionalism 
in the above way, it does make such a reading attractive. 
 Let's now turn to another passage, returning to the story of Master Lai in which: "Gasping and 
wheezing, [Master Lai] lay at the point of death. His wife and children gathered round in a circle 
and began to cry. Master Li, who had come to ask how he was, said, 'Shoo! Get Back! Don't disturb 
the process of change!'" (Watson 2013: 48). It's quite striking that Master Li not only drives out 
the grieving family, but does so in such a rude and excessive way. But if my Conventionalist 
reading is right, there is a very good reason for his strange behavior. For the grief of Master Lai's 
wife and children might influence Master Lai's own attitudes, tempting him to resist or regret his 
transformation resulting in a bound attitude. On Conventionalism, such a change in attitudes would 
be detrimental to Master Lai's survival of the process. Master Li's actions are therefore not mere 
boorishness, but are instead an urgent response to a detrimental situation, a response that is crucial 
for preserving Master Lai's survival of his impending death. This further highlights the importance 
of living in community with like-minded people who can come to each other's aid in such a way. 
The Zhuangzi portrays Masters Si, Yu, Li and Lai as becoming friends upon discovering the unity 
of their attitudes towards death (Watson 2013: 47), this is also portrayed in the friendship of 
Masters Sanghu, Fan and Qinzhang (Watson 2013: 49). On Conventionalism, such community 
becomes crucial not only for maintaining one's attitudes, but also for the preservation of the 
survival of one's death. 
 Finally, let me connect my Conventionalist reading with the famous butterfly dream that 
appears at the end of Chapter 2: 
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Once Zhuang Zhou dreamed he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, 
happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn't know he was Zhuang Zhou. 
Suddenly he woke up, and there he was, solid and unmistakable Zhuang Zhou. But he didn't 
know if he were Zhuang Zhou who had dreamed he was a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming 
he was Zhuang Zhou. Between Zhuang Zhou and a butterfly, there must be some distinction! 
This is called the Transformation of Things. (Watson 2013: 18) 
 
The passage is quite peculiar because it raises an epistemological issue—"he didn't know if he 
were Zhuang Zhou who had dreamed he was a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuang 
Zhou"—but draws an ontological conclusion—"between Zhuang Zhou and a butterfly, there must 
be some distinction! This is called the Transformation of Things." On a Conventionalist reading, 
we can connect the epistemological and the ontological elements via our psychological attitudes. 
That is, the epistemological issue is raised as a therapeutic technique for adopting an attitude of 
being free from the bound; and Zhuangzian Conventionalism implies that such psychological 
freedom brings with it our own survival of death and, hence, our transformation into different 
beings. 
 This reading is similar to what Robert Allinson calls the "external transformation" interpretation, 
on which the passage is read as pointing to the ontological transformations that occur in the world 
(Allinson 1989: 89). This Allinson contrasts with, first, the confusion interpretation on which the 
text is drawing the skeptical conclusion that we can't know whether we're awake or dreaming, and 
second, Allinson's own self-transformation interpretation (which also involves a re-ordering of the 
text) in which the story points to one's transformation to a more enlightened state. Against the 
external transformation interpretation, Allinson raises a number of objections (see Allinson 1989; 
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2012). Though I largely agree with Xiaomei Yang's (2005) replies to those objections, I think that 
there is more that can and should be said against Allinson's objection that the interpretation's 
conclusion is too weak.14 His objection is as follows: 
 
We do not need to have recourse to a dream metaphor to arrive at the awareness that things 
are constantly changing from one to another. If our only concern is transience, we do not 
need any sort of awakening to become aware of this transience. We would not first have to 
go through some puzzle involving a confusion of reality with illusion. We would only have 
a philosopher's lament about the brevity of existence. We would not mistake what is for 
what is not. The butterfly dream would serve as an inapposite metaphor for a complaint 
about the constant succession of things in the world.... (Allinson 1989: 89) 
 
On my Conventionalist reading, however, there's very good reason to appeal to a butterfly dream. 
Since the goal is to help us embrace the idea of surviving in forms wildly different than one's 
human form, dreaming that one is a butterfly is strongly conducive towards that end. For in such 
a dream, one believes oneself to be a butterfly and likewise completely forgets one's human form—
just as Zhuang Zhou "didn't know he was Zhuang Zhou". One might object that this still doesn't 
explain why Zhuangzi needs to appeal to a dream state—why not just have Zhuang Zhou imagine 
that he was a butterfly? But, in response, there's a good reason for this, for in a dream (rather than 
in mere imagination) one is completely immersed in the experience and is completely convinced 
 
14 To this objection, Yang concedes that "we do not have to appeal to a dream to express the idea that everything is in 
a state of endless change" (Yang 2005: 257). She instead responds that the objection can be turned against Allinson's 
own interpretation as well. 
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that one is the butterfly.15 The psychological impact and ability to free one from the bound would 
therefore be much greater than if one were to merely imagine it. But why does the passage mention 
that after awaking Zhuang Zhou "didn't know if he were Zhuang Zhou who had dreamed he was a 
butterfly or a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuang Zhou"? I take this also to be a therapeutic tool. 
For in waking up from the dream, we might easily forget the mindset that we had therein. But in 
reflecting on the idea that even now one might be that butterfly, we are powerfully reminded of 
our psychological state in the dream, consequently the dream's potential to unbind us is amplified. 
 So Allinson is surely correct that "we do not need to have recourse to a dream metaphor to 
arrive at the awareness that things are constantly changing from one to another". But on my 
interpretation, since the goal is not the mere recognition that things change, but instead the 
alteration of our very survival conditions, appealing to and reflecting upon such dream experiences 
turns out to be a powerful everyday tool for allowing us to attain such an end. Furthermore, 
contrary to Thomas Ming's suggestion that the value of the story can be equally captured if the 
dream were instead of a human or a martian (Ming 2012: 499), it's crucial that the dream be of a 
butterfly or some other form radically different from our own. For since the latter sorts of 
experiences are of existing in a radically different way, they have much greater potential for freeing 






15 But we should keep in mind, as Lee reminds us, there are limits to how closely the dream can match the actual 
experience of the butterfly (Lee 2007: 193-4). 
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I have argued for a Conventionalist reading of the Zhuangzi on which, by radically changing our 
attitudes, we can survive our death and persist through the endless transformations of the world. 
Where in envisioning Masters Yu and Lai as surviving as a rooster or a rat's liver, it's tempting to 
interpret this as a mere flight of imagination or a way of pretending—one might even worry that 
it's a sort of delusion. But on the Conventionalist reading there's nothing delusional or fictional 
about it. In adopting an unbound attitude that embraces the endless transformations of the world, 
one can rationally and whole-heartedly exclaim: “How marvelous the Creator is! What is he going 
to make out of you next? Where is he going to send you?” (Watson 2013: 48). 
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